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Abstract We distinguish between three philosophical views on the neuroscience of
predictive models: predictive coding (associated with internal Bayesian models and
prediction error minimization), predictive processing (associated with radical con-
nectionism and ‘simple’ embodiment) and predictive engagement (associated with
enactivist approaches to cognition). We examine the concept of active inference under
each model and then ask how this concept informs discussions of social cognition. In
this context we consider Frith and Friston’s proposal for a neural hermeneutics, and
we explore the alternative model of enactivist hermeneutics.
Keywords Predictive coding · Free energy principle · Active inference ·
Social cognition · Enactivism · Hermeneutics
1 Introduction
Traditional debates about social cognition have been dominated by methodological
individualism, i.e., the idea that mindreading is explained by processes internal to the
individual, for example, representational processes in a theory of mind [ToM] mecha-
nism or a mirror system. Such processes are generally thought to involve feed-forward
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mechanisms in which abstract sensory cues (e.g., a facial expression or gesture)
are recognized and mapped in a tacit meta-representational (folk psychological or
simulation-based) format. Established consensus suggests there are two cortical net-
works responsible for our ability to understand others—a ToM network that includes
the temporo-parietal junction, medial parietal cortex, and medial prefrontal cortex
(e.g., Saxe et al. 2009), and mirror areas in premotor and parietal cortexes (Iacoboni
et al. 2005). Taken together, the neuroscientific findingsmay justify a hybrid of ‘theory
theory’ and simulation theory, or suggest a two-system approach of online perspective
taking and offline social reasoning (Apperly and Butterfill 2009). These approaches
are generally thought to be consistent with classic computational models (Stich and
Nichols 2003).
In ongoing debates, however, some theorists have shifted away from classic com-
putationalism and methodological individualism, motivated by embodied, enactivist
approaches to social cognition that emphasize social interaction, the role of action and
direct social perception in rich environments (e.g., Gallagher 2005, 2008a; Ratcliffe
2007; Reddy and Trevarthen 2004). On this view, the brain is part of a system of
brain-body-environment, and should be understood as in some way contributing to
the overall response of the organism in social or intersubjective situations (Gallagher
et al. 2013) . This type of response does not entail that the brain represents the men-
tal states of others (as maintained in traditional mindreading approaches), but that
the brain participates in a more holistic and embodied process. What precisely does
that mean in regard to brain function? One possible answer may be found in recent
formulations of predictive models, which emphasize active inference and embodi-
ment. On the one hand, it has been argued, the general framework of the predictive
model (specifically the free-energy principle, and the concept of active inference)
is consistent with autopoietic enactivist views (Bruineberg and Rietveld 2014; Bru-
ineberg et al. 2016; Kirchhoff 2016). On the other hand, however, predictive coding’s
internalist and neurocentric tendencies, as well as its concepts of ’inference’ and ’rep-
resentation’, seemingly render it consistent with classic conceptions challenged by
enactivist approaches.
In this paper we survey three philosophical interpretations of the neuroscience
of predictive models: predictive coding (associated with internal Bayesian models
and prediction error minimization, e.g., Hohwy 2013, 2016), predictive process-
ing (associated with radical connectionism and ‘simple’ embodiment, e.g., Clark
1999, 2016) and what we propose to call predictive engagement (associated with
enactivist approaches to cognition).1 We examine the concept of active infer-
ence under each model and then ask how this concept informs discussions of
social cognition. In this context we consider Friston and Frith’s (2015a) pro-
posal for a neural hermeneutics, and we explore an alternative model of enactivist
hermeneutics.
1 Using these terms we are making a distinction that is not made systematically in the current predictive
models literature.
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2 Bayesian basics
Recently there has been a resurgence of generalized predictive models of percep-
tion and neural function, which argue that the brain implements some variation of
Bayes-optimal inference (Hohwy 2013; Friston and Kiebel 2009). While predic-
tion models have a long history in neuroscience and are rooted in psychology and
physiology (Helmholtz 1866; Gregory 1980; Yuille and Kersten 2006), engineer-
ing (Craik 1947, 1948), information theory (Attneave 1954; MacKay 1956), and
models of receptive fields (Srinivasan et al. 1982; Rao and Ballard 1999), predic-
tive coding models differ from the previously described approaches in emphasizing
the importance and ubiquity of top-down predictions or inferences in generat-
ing perception. While predictive models had previously enjoyed some success
in individual domains (e.g., motor control), this new wave emphasizes predic-
tive processes as a universal motif which encompasses and unifies all functional
domains. This ambition of the more recent expansion is now fostering intense philo-
sophical interest and debate. In addition, through the notion of active inference
the predictive approach to perception has been generalized to include an embod-
ied role for action (Friston et al. 2011, 2013). Following from the definition of
unconscious inference developed originally by Helmholtz, predictive theories view
perception not as the mere passive (feed-forward) representation and manipula-
tion of sensory information, but rather as a reciprocal process whereby generative
higher-order models predict the hidden causes of sensory inputs. These models
are generative in the sense that they generate predictions about the world2—
and when statistically inverted, infer the probable causes of sensory input in
terms of (posterior) beliefs. These beliefs3 then constrain future perception and
action in an ongoing inferential loop, as constituted by an ongoing dynamical
interchange between sensory information (prediction errors) and top-down pre-
dictions (prior probability distributions), as played out across the entire neuronal
hierarchy.
Bayesian processing is fundamentally inferential: one tests a prior belief or hypoth-
esis (the “prior” expressed as a probability distribution of some event or parameter)
against some incoming data in order to affirm the prior or update it according to Bayes
rule. Bayes rule is a simple formula from probability theory for inferring how much
one should adjust one’s beliefs, in this probabilistic sense, given some overall likeli-
hood and current evidence. Mismatches (i.e., prediction errors) between the prediction
and the data are then propagated ‘forward’ in the system where they serve to further
2 Though see below, more recent models highlight the importance of modeling the self, world, and their
interaction (Quattrocki and Friston 2014).
3 It is important to note that the terms ‘inference’ and ‘belief’ as used in this context have specific technical
definitions, and speak specifically to the mechanics of probabilistic inference. Beliefs are thus continuous
probability distributions about some state of the world, rather than the explicit propositions and deductions
more typically described in philosophy.
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refine the original hypothesis.4 This process puts into effect a continual scheme of
updating ‘empirical priors’ with sensory evidence.
Predictive coding is said to take place via continuous reciprocal messages passing
between hierarchically arranged canonical neural circuits (Bastos et al. 2012). This
view of the brain as a deep network of asymmetric connections has some empirical
support both in terms of micro- andmacrostructural organization (Felleman and Essen
1991; Markov et al. 2013, 2014). Predictions and prediction errors are thus ubiquitous
and carry information about both the world and our activity within it. Importantly, as
one moves ‘upward’ through the neural hierarchy successive levels predict increas-
ingly more complex, multi-dimensional, contextualized information, and are, as such,
sensitive to the slower timescales that are most relevant to personal phenomena. It
is worth noting that this functional and temporal scalability is not a mere addition
of theoretical convenience, but rather a direct statistical feature of any hierarchical
Bayesian inference, and can be formally equated with computational deep learning,
where the highest levels of a neural network learn complex, domain general features
by predicting patterns of activity across their lower-level nodes. This equips the brain
with the ability to deeply contextualize sensory information not only through some
late or additive cognitive process, but also by actual interaction with the most basic
levels of sensation.
Predictive models can also provide a more general characterization of biological
systems in terms of Markov blankets, a concept derived from formal treatments of
Bayesian networks, Markov decision theory, and causal dependency (Auletta 2013;
Friston 2013; Friston et al. 2015). On this view, biological systems are ergodic dynam-
ical systems that possess aMarkov blanket. A system can be described as ergodic if the
average time spent in a given state is the probability of being found in that state when
sampled at random. It follows then, that adaptive fitness can be understood in terms
of ergodicity and the endurance for survival of a system in the face of a constantly
changing environment. Mathematically, this can be expressed in terms of behaviors
that place an upper bound on possible states that can be occupied, such that organisms
are more likely to inhabit certain states over others (namely, those that minimize their
entropy or average surprise).5 An organism in relation to its environment is defined in
terms of a Markov blanket, which is just a collection of states that define the boundary
between organism and environment.6 The states that constitute the Markov blanket
4 In some cases the notion of inferences in the brain is considered to be metaphorical. We find this in
Helmholtz (1866): the processes of perception ‘are like inferences insofar as we from the observed effect
on our senses arrive at an idea of the cause of this effect’; as well as in Hohwy’s conception of PC: causal
inference in the brain is “analogous in many respects to our everyday reasoning about cause and effect, and
to scientific methods of causal inference” (Hohwy 2013).
5 Note that this is just a consequence of the axiom stated previously, i.e. that any persisting biological
system will be one that resists entropy.
6 Indeed, any system of causal dependencies which meets these basic requirements can be described
as possessing a Markov blanket, and a biological organism could be characterized as possessing many
‘blankets-within-blankets’ (single neurons, neural networks, the embodied organism, its society, and so
on).
123
Synthese
Fig. 1 A schematic diagram of aMarkov Blanket. The circle shaded in gray represents theMarkov blanket
of Node A, consisting ofA, it’s children, parents, and parents of children, with parent/child being understood
in terms of cause/effect. In small script, the sub-partition of internal and external states according to the
Free Energy Principle (Friston 2013); H hidden external states, I internal states, A internal active states, S
internal sensory states
comprise sensory states and agential states that mediate action—such as movement7
(see Fig. 1). Markov blankets thus play the role similar to that of a cell wall, sep-
arating internal and external states to create stable (ergodic) internal dynamics that
do not themselves directly impinge upon the external dynamics responsible for their
emergence.
According to this characterization, external states are hidden from the internal states
and can only be seen through the Markov blanket (i.e., through action). Since states
external to the blanket can only be seen indirectly by those inside it (by virtue of
their causal dependencies), the blanket constitutes a boundary between the world and
the organism. The Markov blanket can then be sub-divided into those that are either
the children of external states (sensations) or internal states (actions). Within this
mathematical setup, one can formally demonstrate that if an organism is ergodic and
organized along these lines, then its internal states can be described as a generative
(probabilistic) model of the hidden (external) states. Thus this view deeply weds an
agent’s ‘representation’ of the world to the autopoietic actions it must undertake to
maintain its persistence. This can be seen when considering the dependencies between
the four states (external, sensory, active, and internal) comprising the Markov blanket:
7 Formally, the parents, children, and parents of children of a node constitute its Markov blanket, where
parent/child can be understood in terms of cause and effect (see Fig. 1).
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External states cause sensory states that influence—but are not influenced by—
internal states, while internal states cause active states that influence—but are not
influenced by—external states. Crucially, the dependencies induced by Markov
blankets create a circular causality that is reminiscent of the action–perception
cycle. The circular causality here means that external states cause changes in
internal states, via sensory states, while the internal states couple back to the
external states through active states—such that internal and external states cause
each other in a reciprocal fashion. This circular causality may be a fundamental
and ubiquitous causal architecture for self-organization (Friston 2013, pp. 2–3).
Thus internal states can be said to infer the hidden causes of sensory states,which are
themselves influenced by the perturbation of the world by active states. The inherent
circularity of this scheme means that actions (which cause changes in the external
world, but not sensory states) place an upper bound on the entropy of biological states,
serving to maintain a homeostatic equilibrium that is informed by internal states.
According to Friston, an agent thus has two means by which to maintain its structural
and functional integrity; either through the accurate internal prediction of hidden
(external) causes8 or by acting on the environment in ways that minimize sensory
surprise. Together, the ensuing changes in active (action) and internal (perception)
states constitute active inference.
3 An internalist predictive coding model
This characterization of predictive models is open to several interpretations. Hohwy
(2013) develops an internalist version of predictive coding (PC) strongly influenced
by the Helmholtzian notion of inference. On this interpretation, since the brain has no
access to the external world it needs to represent that world by some internal model
that it constructs by decoding sensory input—it does this by making probabilistic
inferences/hypotheses about the world and correcting those inferences by reducing
prediction errors. Here inference is defined as the use of Bayesian reasoning to come
to a conclusion on the basis of evidence.
For Hohwy, prediction-error minimization (PEM) is primary; active inference is
in service to the central processes that do the real work. He takes the concept of the
Markov blanket to constitute a strict partition between world and organism, which
means that the brain is cut off from the world.
PEM should make us resist conceptions of [a mind-world] relation on which the
mind is in some fundamental way open or porous to the world, or on which it
is in some strong sense embodied, extended or enactive. Instead, PEM reveals
the mind to be inferentially secluded from the world, it seems to be more neu-
rocentrically skull-bound than embodied or extended, and action itself is more
an inferential process on sensory input than an enactive coupling with the envi-
ronment. (Hohwy 2016, p. 259; see his note 14 on the Markov blanket).
8 This is approximately equivalent to the internal inferences appealed to in classic predictive coding.
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OnHohwy’s reading of PC, the model of Bayesian inference entails a strong epistemic
boundary that divides the brain from the rest of the body and the world (Hohwy 2013).
Indeed, he identifies the boundary of the Markov blanket as explicitly located at the
dorsal horn of the spinal cord, ‘where descending proprioceptive predictions from
the brain are compared with ascending prediction errors from stretch receptors in the
muscles’ (2016, p. 276).
Not all schemes of predictive modeling, however, are strictly internalistic; depend-
ing on how one delineates the boundaries of the Markov blanket, one can end up with
a more or less enactivist, yet still prediction-oriented view of the brain (see Allen and
Friston 2016). This continuum of views has implications for our understanding of
social dynamics, and indeed, as we’ll now see, there is a distinct emphasis on embodi-
ment, interaction, and narrative in some of the recent dynamical variants of predictive
modeling (Friston et al. 2011; Friston and Frith 2015b).
4 Predictive processing: unfolding the Markov blanket
Andy Clark’s notion of predictive processing (PP) retains some of the same PC ideas
about the relation between brain and world.
[The brain] must discover information about the likely causes of impinging
signals without any form of direct access to their source… [A]ll that it ‘knows’,
in any direct sense, are the ways its own states (e.g., spike trains) flow and alter.
In that (restricted) sense, all the system has direct access to is its own states. The
world itself is thus off-limits… (Clark 2013, p. 183)
In this respect, the brain seems to be in the same position as the experimenter: The
brain’s task is to take ‘patterns of neural activation and, on that basis alone, infer
properties of the stimulus’ in the same way that the experimenter interprets patterns of
voxels on the fMRI scan ‘to infer (decode) the properties of the stimulus that brought
them about’ (Clark 2016, p. 95).
But Clark also sees PEM processes as closely tied to movement and action—i.e.,
active inference—and argues that PP offers support for a more embodied and enactive
theory of cognition (Clark 2015, 2016).
This means that ‘inference’, as it functions in the [PP] story, is not compelled
to deliver internal states that bear richly reconstructive contents. It is not there
to construct an inner realm able to stand in for the full richness of the external
world. Instead, it may deliver efficient, low-cost strategies whose unfolding and
success depend delicately and continuously upon the structure and ongoing con-
tributions of the external realm itself as exploited by various forms of action and
intervention. (Clark 2016, p. 191).
This suggests that we do not have to think that the outcome of PP is the creation of a
representation in the brain—‘a kind of internal model of the source of the signals: the
world hidden behind the veil of perception’ (Clark 2013, p. 184). Rather, we can think
of the brain as engaged in finding the distributed neural states ‘that best accommodate
the current sensory barrage’ (Clark 2016, p. 192). By ‘best accommodate’, Clark
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denotes an approach to computation different from the classic (i.e., propositional or
modular) notion. Instead, inference and ‘representation’ are here distributed across
the entire network of feed-forward and feed-back connections, in an ongoing circular
dynamic, as determined by a ubiquitous precision weighting mechanism. Depending
on how one chooses to demarcate the boundaries of the ‘Markov Blanket’, this web of
causal influencemayextend to the self-active inferences inwhich anorganismengages;
inferences which are themselves a core part of the computational tapestry. Here, the
brain is more like a deep network of distributed possibilities than a disembodied CPU,
exploiting the dynamics of the body to achieve low-cost solutions to cognitive and
environmental demands.
In active inference, the brain does this, not by sitting back and formulating hypothe-
ses, but via ‘world-engaging action’ (2016, p. 192). For Clark, on the one hand, active
inference (as in PC) is in the service of generating information that is sent back to the
brain for central processing. In this respect, world-engaging action acts as a ‘comple-
ment to neural information-processing’ (Lungarella and Sporns 2005). On the other
hand, Clark pushes towards a more enactivist story: problem solving is distributed
across brain-body-environment, and this ‘allows the productively lazy brain to do as
little as possible while still solving (or rather, while the whole embodied, environ-
mentally located system) solves the problem’ (2016, p. 248). The enactivist story is
in parentheses.
5 Predictive engagement: removing the parentheses
Following the idea that active inference underscores the importance of embodiment
and dynamical interaction (Friston et al. 2011; Friston and Frith 2015a, b; Kilner et al.
2007), why not remove those parentheses? On the enactivist model, we can think of the
process as a kind of ongoing predictive engagement (PE)—a dynamical adjustment in
which the brain, as part of and along with the larger organism, actively responds in
ways that allow for the right kind of ongoing attunement with the environment—an
environment that is physical but also social and cultural.
Conceiving of the differences or continuities among the positions of PC, PP, and
PE depends on how one views the boundaries of the Markov blanket, not just where
the boundaries are drawn, but the nature of the boundaries—whether they keep the
world ‘off limits’, as Clark suggests, or enable coupling. For PC and PP, active infer-
ence is part of a process that produces sensory experiences that confirm or test my
expectations; e.g., active ballistic saccades do not merely passively orient to features
but actively sample the bits of the world that fit my expectations or resolve uncertainty
(Friston et al 2012)—‘sampling the world in ways designed to test our hypotheses and
to yield better information for the control of action itself’ (Clark 2016, p. 7; see Hohwy
2013, p. 79). On the enactivist view, however, the dynamical adjustment/attunement
process that encompasses the whole of the system is not a mere testing or sampling
that serves better neural prediction; active inference is more action than inference;
it’s a doing, an enactive adjustment, a worldly engagement—with anticipatory and
corrective aspects already included.
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Enactivists suggest that the brain is not located at the center, conducting tests along
the radiuses; it’s on the circumference, one station amongst other stations involved in
the loop that also navigates through the body and environment and forms the whole.
Neural accommodation occurs via constant reciprocal interaction between the brain
and body, and notions of adjustment and attunement can be cashed out in terms of
physical dynamical processes that involve brain and body, including autonomic and
peripheral nervous systems. We can see how this enactivist interpretation can work by
exploring a more basic conception operating in these predictive models, namely, the
free energy principle (FEP).
6 Free energy and active inference
Among the various implementations of these predictive models, the most relevant for
more embodied theories of cognition are those derived from the free-energy principle,
which positions the mechanisms of the predictive model within a dynamical and
information theoretic treatment. Although this scheme was originally developed as a
unifying theory of neural function (see, for example, Friston 2010), it has recently been
expanded to serve as a bridge between information theory and biological processes
themselves (Friston 2013; Friston et al. 2015). The FEP argues that biological systems
are foremost definedby the tendency to resist the second lawof thermodynamics, on the
basis that to do otherwisewould entail the unbounded increase of entropy, i.e., systemic
death. This is accomplished in a manner that is analogous to autopoietic9 cellular
processes (Varela et al. 1974), where, by avoiding unexpected states, an autonomous
agent maintains its own dynamical integrity (minimizing surprise). Aswewill explain,
these approaches are unique insofar as they attempt tomake concrete linkages between
notions of embodiment, environment and brain processes through the application of
information theoretic principles.10
It is the capacity for active inference that renders the predictive model, as derived
from the FEP, autopoietic and embodied. On this model an organism both generates
internal dynamics (e.g., probabilistic predictions embodied in the neural network) that
maximize survival (minimize free energy), and acts on the world in such a way as
to cause sensory information to conform to prior predictions. Summarized simply, if
an entity resists entropy and is comprised of locally interacting states or processes
arranged in a Markov blanket, then FEP argues that it will survive either by accurately
predicting worldly states (which entails their contextualization by the organism’s pos-
sibilities for action), or by acting on the world such as to render it unsurprising (which
entails the sensitivity of action to the states of the organism). In this scheme, sensory-
motor coupling is always slave to the organism’s (homeostatic) dynamics, which the
9 This is typically construed as the emergent or self-organizing persistence of an organism in virtue of its
own dynamical structure.
10 Although the formalisms supporting the FEP are beyond the scope of this paper (see Feldman and
Friston 2010; Friston 2010; Friston et al. 2010 for a formal treatment), we attempt to relate them here in
a general fashion in order to better illuminate any potential overlap (or lack thereof) between PC, PP and
PE. The FEP and its derivations depend primarily upon the assumption that biological systems are ergodic
dynamical systems that possess a Markov blanket (see above).
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system must maintain to survive. Any action or perception is constrained by this need
to maintain autopoietic integrity. Heuristically, this can be thought of as the system
always seeking to maximize evidence for the hypothesis that it is alive. Thus, from
the basic axioms of thermodynamics, information theory, and probabilistic dependen-
cies, the FEP proffers an explanation of how homeostatic biological systems emerge
naturally from coupled dynamics between internal and external states and their co-
constitution.
Following the FEP, perception and active inference are two sides of the same
precision-weighted process allowing for the prioritization of actions that are likely
to produce predicted outcomes and the contextualization of perception by prior action
and history. This dependency of action on the structure of perception (and vice versa)
provides a deeply embodied form of engagement, where the priors and actions an
organism is likely to entertain are fundamentally constrained and afforded by the mor-
phological structure of the agent’s body. In this way, the Bayesian brain is uniquely
equipped to exploit the finely tuned properties of an organism’s dynamic morpholog-
ical body and associated Umwelt.
A study byBarrett andBar (2009); see also (Barrett and Simmons 2015; Chanes and
Barrett 2016) can help to clarify howmore embodied-enactivist predictive engagement
can be seen as consistent with views on free energy and active inference. They propose
the affective prediction hypothesiswhich ‘implies that responses signaling an object’s
salience, relevance or value do not occur as a separate step after the object is identified.
Instead, affective responses support vision from the very moment that visual stimu-
lation begins’ (2009, p. 1325). Along with the earliest visual processing, the medial
orbital frontal cortex is activated, initiating a train of muscular and hormonal changes
throughout the body, generating ‘interoceptive sensations’ from organs, muscles, and
joints associated with prior experience, which integrates with current exteroceptive
sensory information. The organism as a whole responds and contributes to shaping
subsequent actions.
The OFC’s ongoing integration of sensory information from the external world
with that from the body indicates that conscious percepts are indeed intrinsically
infused with affective value, so that the affective salience or significance of an
object is not computed after the fact. As it turns out, the OFC plays a crucial
role in forming the predictions that support object perception. […T]he predic-
tions generated during object perception carry affective value as a necessary and
normal part of visual experience. (Barrett and Bar 2009, p. 1328).11
This suggests that priors, which include affect, are not just in the brain, but involve
whole body dispositions and adjustments—‘anatomically informed priors’ (Freund
et al. 2016; see also Allen and Friston 2016). In perception bodily affective changes
are integrated with sensory-motor processing so that before we fully recognize an
11 It’s likely that the ventral medial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), anterior cingulate, and insula are also
involved in these processes. The VMPFC both processes value/reward and has descending modulations
to the spinal cord and parasympathetic nervous system. Similarly, insula and cingulate are involved in
integrating sensations from the various modalities with higher-order contexts, and they send long range
modulations both to basic visual cortex, VMPFC, and the brainstem/visceral control centers (see Allen
et al. 2016b).
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object or other person for what it or he or she is, our bodies are already configured
into overall peripheral and autonomic patterns shaped by prior associations.
This implies, first, that perception is not just for recognition or identification—
althoughmany descriptions of the predictive process seem focused on simply inferring
what the perceived object is. Nor is perception just for action—as many enactivists
suggest (e.g., Noë 2004). Perception is also reward-oriented, hedonic, aesthetic, and
affective in the broadest sense—and in ways that suggest that wemay enjoy (and seek)
perceptual surprise.12 Second, perceptual networks are dynamically connected to and
(both in terms of those connections, and in terms of plastic changes) affected by deeply
embodied processes that involve endocrine and autonomic systems.13 For example,
fatigue and hunger involve extra-neural processes that influence brain function. Home-
ostatic regulation happens via mutual (largely chemical) influences between parts of
the endocrine system, with some dynamical relation to the autonomic system. In
cases of hypoglycemia (which may lead to slower or weaker brain function, or some
brain functions turning off, or at the extreme, brain death), for example, perception
is modulated because the perceptual system (brain and body) is chemically (materi-
ally) affected by hunger and fatigue. There are real physical connections here in the
complex chemistry of the body-brain system in its coupling with the environment.
Brains thus participate in a system, along with all these other bodily and environ-
mental factors, and it would work differently, because the priors and surprises in the
system would be different, if these other factors were different. Enactivists often turn
to dynamical systems theory to explicate such issues. DST treats organisms as com-
plex systems composed of many individual elements embedded within, and open to,
a complex environment.
As in many other complex systems in nature… parts are coordinated without an
executive agent or programme that produces the organized pattern. Rather, coher-
ence is generated solely in the relationships between the organic components
and the constraints and opportunities of the environment. This self-organization
means that no single element has causal priority. (Smith and Thelen 2003, pp.
343–344).
On a more dynamical and enactivist reading, the free-energy principle, which, as
we’ve seen, Friston (2013) characterizes in terms of ‘circular causality’, points to a
broader theoretical framework that links up with the concept of autopoiesis. A self-
organizing system needs to be attuned to its ecological niche in such a way that it
anticipates and minimizes surprise by taking action so that, as Bruineberg et al. (2016)
put it: ‘the coupled dynamics of the organism-environment system remain within a
12 We do sometimes enjoy surprises even if our systems are set up to minimize surprises. Predictive
coding accounts of this are framed in pragmatic or economic terms—we trade relative short-term certainty
(the possibility of a short-term loss) for the possibility of higher-degrees of long-term certainty (or gain).
One may often be in a situation where an option one doesn’t know very much about will have the highest
‘epistemic’ value, because of the possibility that it could reveal entirely new options and result in the greatest
long term reduction in surprise (or free energy) (Friston et al. 2016; Schwartenbeck et al. 2013).
13 Enactivists would claim that these deeply embodied processes are non-representational and that the
hypothalamus operates on homeostatic principles rather than anything that can be construed as representa-
tional principles (see, e.g., Gallagher, in press-a).
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relatively small subset of states that maintain the organism’s viability in its econiche’
(also see Friston et al. 2011). Bruineberg et al. suggest that Friston’s emphasis on active
inference leaves open the possibility of the alternative enactivist interpretation, i.e.,
PE, which emphasizes dynamical coupling of the organism with its environment, and
works out the FEP in terms of enactive autopoiesis. This may be what Friston (2013)
means when he says that the agent doesn’t have a model, the agent is the model. ‘We
must here understand “model” in the most inclusive sense, as combining interpretive
dispositions, morphology, and neural architecture, and as implying a highly tuned “fit”
between the active, embodied organism and the embedded environment’ (Friston et al
2012, p. 6).
In an autopoietic system, the boundary does not cut the system off from its envi-
ronment but defines a coupling of organism-environment.
The importance of such a boundary for living organisms has been central in the
autopoietic approach from the very start…. If this is the only kind of boundary
that stems from the free-energy principle, then there seems to be nothing in the
idea of probabilistic inference per se that challenges enactive cognitive science
(Bruineberg et al. 2016).
This general conception can be specified in terms of defining the basic (survival-
enhancing) affordances that are relative to each animal—each organism-environment.
As Friston (2010, p. 127) suggests, ‘a fish out of water would be in a surprising state
(both emotionally and mathematically). A fish that frequently forsook water would
have high entropy’. A fish out of water can perceive and predict, and adjust their
generative model all they want, but, as Bruineberg et al. suggest, it doesn’t survive
unless it is afforded some action. By perception alone the organism doesn’t know
or control its own viability conditions. It discovers them and can control them only
by taking action. ‘So within the free-energy framework, it is action that does the
work of actually minimizing surprisal. Actions change an organism’s relation to the
environment, thereby changing the sensory states of the organism…. (Bruineberg et al.
2016). Action is not something happening in the brain, and is not just providing new
sensory input for the brain; it’s what the whole organism does in its interactions with
the environment, or under a different description, what a person does in the world, and
this changes the world as much as it changes the brain.
On this enactivist view, the priors that inform action include bodily skills, patterns
of action-readiness and affective dispositions that mesh with an affordance space.
Perception is not isolated from such action; ‘perception is an inevitable consequence
of active exchange with the environment’ (Friston 2009, p. 293). Bruineberg et al.
rightly cite John Dewey’s notion of organism-environment. We think that Dewey’s
notion of situation is also relevant. For Dewey (1938), the situation is not equivalent
to the environment, but includes the agent in such a way that agent and environment
are co-defined. The agent cannot step outside of the situation without changing it.
If I am in what Dewey calls a problematic situation, I cannot strictly point to the
situation because my pointing is part of the situation. My movement is a movement
of the situation—and a rearrangement of objects in the situation is a rearrangement
of oneself as well. As it happens, this is precisely what Gadamer (2004) calls the
‘hermeneutic situation’.
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7 Neural or enactivist hermeneutics of social cognition?
Chris Frith has developed his notion of ‘neural hermeneutics’ in the context of the
uncertainty involved in intersubjective, face-to-face communication.
Even if I am talking with you face-to-face, I cannot access your mind to check
whether my interpretation of what you have just said corresponds to what you
intended me to understand. I can create a coherent story, but I can never get
independent evidence about the correctness of my interpretations. (Frith and
Wentzer 2013, p. 657).
Nonetheless, as Frith notes, “in spite of this apparently insurmountable difficulty,”
we seem to manage to understand each other. How is that possible?
On something closer to the PC model, we can think of the uncertainty involved
in our lack of access to the other person’s mind as a particular instance of the more
general uncertainty tied to the brain’s lack of access to the world, e.g., when it is trying
to determine whether a visual object is an apple. Thus, Friston and Frith (2015a, p.
130) suggest that ‘the criteria for evaluating and updating my interpretation of your
behaviour are exactly the same criteria that underlie action and perception in general;
namely, the minimisation of prediction error or (variational) free energy’. Likewise,
Frith and Wentzer propose that, the same PC principle can be applied when trying to
understand the mental world of others. In the social setting, however, ‘the process goes
in both directions: while I am trying to understand you, you are trying to understand
me’ (Frith and Wentzer 2013, p. 658).
On this view, social cognition involves processes of perception and of folk-
psychological inference. The brain starts, for example, with sensory evidence of
observed behaviour or spoken words; it then attempts to infer, through a series of
hierarchical predictions, the thought or belief or desire that causes the behaviour.
Here the sensory evidence might be the words I hear from which I infer the idea
you are trying to convey. I can test my inference, not only by predicting what else
you are likely to say, but also by saying something myself and predicting how
you will respond. Meanwhile you will be applying the same strategy to what I
say. When our prediction errors become sufficiently low, then we have probably
understood one another. (Frith and Wentzer 2013, p. 658)
Frith and Friston suggest this PC formulation captures the sense of the hermeneutic
circle, understood in traditional terms of parts and whole. The whole can only be
understood in terms of the parts, and the parts can only be understood in terms of the
whole. ‘In the same way, in the predictive coding loop, the inferred cause (the idea,
the whole) predicts the evidence, while, at the same time, the evidence (the words, the
parts) modifies the inferred cause’ (Frith and Wentzer 2013, p. 658).
Frith further suggests that a simulation theory of social cognition can give us an
account of the priors that allow us to get started and can address what we can call
the diversity problem—i.e., the problem that others are often very different from us.
Mirror neuron based simulation creates an alignment that purportedly solves this prob-
lem; e.g., in dyadic conversation we mimic the gestures, facial expressions, emotions,
intonations and even the vocabulary of others. Even if we are somewhat different from
123
Synthese
each other, alignment ‘makes us more similar to the person we are interacting with and
thereby makes motor and mental simulation more efficient’ (Frith and Wentzer 2013,
p. 659).14 As agents enter into this seeming infinite regress of mutual prediction, it
is proposed that their brains create an informational bridge of sorts, as described by
Friston and Frith:
However, this infinite regress dissolves if the two brains are formally similar
and each brain models the sensations caused by itself and the other as being
generated in the same way. In other words, if there is a shared narrative or
dynamic that both brains subscribe to, they can predict each other exactly, at
least for short periods of time. This is the basic idea that we pursue in the context
of active inference and predictive coding. In fact… this solution is a necessary
and emergent phenomenon,when twoormore (formally similar) active inference
schemes are coupled to each other. Mathematically, the result of this coupling is
called generalised synchronisation (aka synchronisation of chaos) (Friston and
Frith 2015a, p. 130)
Generalised synchronization leads to the emergence of a rich tapestry of inter-
relating explicit beliefs, implicit norms, and rich sensory-motor interactions.15 What
makes social interaction unique, then, is the emergence of this unifying ‘narrative’
(generative model) and its role in shaping our own individualized perception. The
Bayesian formulation thus appeals to mutually interlocking active inferences (inter-
actions), in which the emergence of generalized synchrony allows one actor not only
to predict the other, but to actively entrain their perceptual and motor states.
This is an optimistic hermeneutics. Frith and Wentzer (2013) cite Schleiermacher;
and in this context they could easily have cited Dilthey on empathy (see Gallagher, in
press-b). Both thinkers endorse the principle of romantic hermeneutics, namely, that
we understand others ‘better than they understand themselves’. But we can also (and
often do) misunderstand the other—the possibility of which leads us to Gadamer’s
notion that one doesn’t necessarily understand better—‘one understands differently
when one understands at all’ (2004, p. 280). Sometimeswe find ourselves in pernicious
14 In describing their model of generalized synchrony, Frith stays with a subpersonal simulationist account,
but notes the importance of explicit social beliefs and communication: ‘we have only considered a very
elemental form of communication (and implicit theory of mind). We have not considered the reflective
processing that may accompany its deliberative (conscious) aspects. This is an intriguing and challenging
area (particularly from the point of view of modelling) that calls on things like deceit’ (Friston and Frith
2015b, p. 12). In this regard, one question is whether the Bayesian PC account scales up to a point where
one can say that the prior actually involves a theory of the folk psychological kind. Friston (2012) thinks it
can. He understands motor behavior to depend on predictive coding, and he states: ‘at a more abstract level,
predictions about how we will physically move are composed and generated in a way that determines how
we behave. Perhaps the most important determinants of our behaviour (and their underlying predictions)
are beliefs about the intentions and behaviour of others. This necessarily requires an internal model of self
in relation to others and an implicit sense of agency’ (Friston 2012, p. 249).
15 For the dynamic Bayesians two systems interacting can be treated just as a special instance of the
Markovian processes characterizing any single agent. Indeed, Friston and Frith demonstrate via computer
simulation that when two birds equipped with active inference and precision-weighting sing to one another
they necessarily exhibit generalized synchrony (Friston and Frith 2015b, Appendix A).
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misunderstandings—as if our systems failed to produce appropriate prediction errors
when they should.
In contrast to neural hermeneutics, we propose an alternative enactivist hermeneu-
tics, consistent with PE, and supporting a more interactionist approach to social
cognition (e.g., Gallagher 2008b). Note first that according to the interactionist
approach, social cognition is not just about inferring mental states (mindreading)
for purposes of predicting behavior. We see this already in the notion of alignment
which points to processes that go beyond the brain—processes of interaction that
depend on the other person, embodied comportment, and the particularities of the sit-
uation. Perception of another’s face, for example, activates not just the face recognition
area and ventral stream, but, importantly, the dorsal visual pathway that informs our
motor system—suggesting that we perceive action affordances in the face of the other
(Debruille et al. 2012). That is, we don’t simply perceive the snapshot of a face in an
instant, with the task of recognizing it, we respond dynamically over time to affor-
dances offered by the others’ emotions as well as by their actions. Face perception
presents not just objective features or patterns that we might recognize conceptually
as emotions—it involves complex interactive behavioral and response patterns arising
out of an active engagement with the other’s face—yielding an experience of signifi-
cance or valence that shapes response.16 Social perception is affective inways different
from object perception. The experience of the gaze of another person directed back at
you affects you, and your perception of the other’s emotion affects you, even if this
affect is not consciously recognized.
Likewise, to perceive an emotion, as a bodily expression, is not simply to recognize
an emotional pattern, as if the task were simply to identify the emotion (something
that many experiments seem to set as the primary task). Even when presented with
masked, subliminal images of angry or happy or disgusted faces or bodies, one’s
autonomic and peripheral systems respond (Tamietto 2013), and such unconscious
changes in arousal can influence conscious perceptual decisions (Allen et al. 2016a).
Such changes in arousal are part of what the perception is, as Barrett and Bar (2009)
suggest. In contexts of real interaction the issue goes beyond emotion identification;
it’s rather a matter of how one affectively responds to emotion. To perceive an emo-
tion is to experience significance and to become attuned to a valence that manifests
itself as affectively relevant, and this has an effect on the perceiver’s whole body
(de Gelder 2013). Just as perception is not merely the identification or recognition
of an object or a pattern of features—a cold, calculative, cognitive explanation—
social cognition is not just prediction and the elimination of prediction errors that
seemingly finishes when the brain has inferred the correct mental state in the other’s
mind—as if correctness or hypothesis confirmation were the primary goal. In real
interactive situations such affective processes do not always lead to a simple or
16 We note that this idea links directly to the idea that homeostatic information influences the overall
precision of the brain. A neutral face will appear nice or nasty depending upon my prior sense of whether
it will help me stay alive or not. We also note that generalized synchrony can be malicious; one agent can
falsely express a state of happiness, in order to infect another agent with a false sense of understanding.
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clean simulation; indeed, they can interfere with alignment and undermine simula-
tion.17
In contrast to what happens in real interactions, simulation theory emphasizes
inhibitory mechanisms and the sequestering or quarantining of simulated states,
regarded as pretend or vicarious states (e.g. Goldman 2006). As Jacob (2008) points
out, simulation is portrayed as matching what has just happened (the other’s immedi-
ate past action) and for that reason is not predictive or forward looking. Alignment,
however, can be conceived, not as a mimicking of past action, but rather as an antic-
ipatory response, a real bodily process modulated by morphologial, affective, and,
as Frith might say, ‘top-top-down’ cultural factors (Roepstorff and Frith 2004; Shea
et al. 2014)—priors that shape neural and extra-neural processes through plastic and
metaplastic mechanisms (Malafouris 2013). That priors have an impact on the pre-
dictive dynamics of brain function means the brain has been ‘set up to be set off’
(Prinz 2004, p. 55). There is, in this regard, a hermeneutical circle that involves the
brain-body-environment, and not just the working of the brain. In terms of traditional
hermeneutics, it’s not Schleiermacher’s hermeneutical circle of parts-whole, resolved
in a correct interpretation via the methodological bracketing or inhibition of the inter-
preter’s beliefs or actions, but Gadamer’s anticipatory pre-understanding that projects
meaning from the perspective of the agent in the situation, which in turn leads to
further interaction.
Thus, consistent with the enactivist conception of PE, the explanatory unit of per-
ception (or cognition, or action, etc.) is not just the brain, or even two (or more) brains
in the case of social cognition (cf. Hasson et al. 2012), but dynamical relations between
organism and environment, or between two or more embodied agents. The enactivist
thus draws the boundaries of the relevant Markov blanket not at the brain or spinal
cord, but instead at the level of persons engaged in the world and with one another.18
The processes of social interaction include active engagements with others in socially
defined environments, characterized by embodied interactions and affective processes
where distinct forms of sensory-motor-interoceptive couplings are generated by the
perception and response to facial expression, posture, movement, gestures, etc. in rich
pragmatic and social contexts.
On the enactivist view, social cognition is an attunement process that allows an agent
to perceive the other as someone to respond to or with whom one can interact. In the
intersubjective context, perception serves interaction. In some cases, understanding the
other person, and in some cases mutual understanding, is dynamically accomplished
in the social interaction itself where some novel shared meaning (or some decision
17 Cultural differences can also do this. For example, relative toEuropeanAmericans,Asians showdifferent
neural processing in response to images of faces that represent a social-evaluative threat (Park and Kitayama
2012; also Xu et al. 2009). In-group members fail to understand out-group member actions—particularly
prominent for out-groups who are disliked and dehumanized (Gutsell and Inzlicht 2010).
18 One reviewer rightly points out that the concept of Markov blanket is relative to how one defines the
system. “There are blankets nested within blankets.When two people are interacting a blanket forms around
them, but the individual blankets still remain (just as there is a blanket around an organism and around each
of the cells of which the organism is composed). At an even higher level there are cultural Markov blankets
maintaining the existence of learned societies and nations. This is a point that Chris Frith also has made in
conversation. We agree.
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or even some misunderstanding) is instituted in a way that could not be instituted by
brain processes alone inside the single individual (De Jaegher et al. 2010; Di Paolo and
De Jaegher 2012). In this respect, the boundary of the Markov blanket is not drawn
to enclose either the brain or the body, but is variable and extends to include relevant
bits of the immediate environment, including other agents, as we engage with them.
It is defined relative to the scope of engagement, which can expand to include others
through the dynamics of the interaction process itself.
In a brain-body-environment system, changes or adjustments to neural processing
will accompany any changes in body or environment, not because the isolated brain
infers such changes and responds to them in central command mode, but because the
brain is part of the larger embodied system that is coping with its changing environ-
ment. Just as the hand adjusts to the shape of the object to be grasped, so the brain
adjusts to the circumstances of organism-environment. Rather than thinking of this as
a kind of inference, enactivists think of it as a kind of dynamic adjustment process in
which the brain, as part of and alongwith the larger organism, settles into the right kind
of attunement with the environment. Social interaction thus involves the integration
of brain processes into a complex mix of transactions that involve moving, gesturing,
and engaging with the expressive bodies of others; bodies that incorporate artifacts,
tools, and technologies, that are situated in various physical environments, and defined
by diverse social roles and institutional practices. The priors and the surprises in the
brain would be different if these other factors were different.
8 Conclusion
In the contrasts between PC, PP, and PE there are not just vocabulary differences;
there is a basic conceptual problem about how the different models understand brain
function. These seem to be philosophical differences more than neuroscientific ones—
differences that concern our understanding of concepts like representation, inference,
embodiment, engagement, attunement, affordance, etc. We think that further progress
on these issueswill depend to some extent on sorting out the very basic issue of defining
the unit of explanation (brain vs. brain-body-environment) and controversies about the
vocabulary of the explanans. If, for example, for an enactivist PE account, inference
and representation are not key parts of the explanans, it needs to provide further expla-
nation of how precisely processes like adjustment, attunement, and accommodation
work as part of predictive engagement.
Notwithstanding the strong contrasts, there is clearly some common ground on
which the differences among predictive models can be clarified. There is much more
to be said, for example, about plasticity and prior experience. The neural networks
of perceptual systems and association areas may be set up by previous experience
to be set off by forthcoming experience—a process captured in Jesse Prinz’s (2004)
fortunate phrase of being ‘set up to be set off’. Early sensory areas are set up by prior
(personal, social, and cultural) experience. For example, V1 neurons are activated not
just for feature detection but in predictive anticipation of reward if they have been
tuned by prior experience (Shuler and Bear 2006). In that case, priors are already
part of a sensory mechanism that will directly shape perception and the organism’s
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response. If a scientist insists that when the activation of one set of neurons (as priors)
modulates another select set of neurons (as a process of precision weighting), this just
is what is meant by inference, then the enactivist can rightly ask whether one needs
the vocabulary of inference to signify what is a physical modulation in this case.
Similarly, with respect to social cognition, previous embodied interaction with oth-
ers attunes neural systems for further interaction (Di Paolo and De Jaegher 2012). The
mirror system, for example, may be the result of prior associative processes and may
activate without the requirement of inferential processes (Heyes 2010). Attunement
of the mirror system through prior experience or skilled expertise with an observed
action modifies perception, prediction and interpretation of that action (Calvo-Merino
et al. 2005). Perception of a certain facial pattern, for example, may already be attuned
to directly see that pattern as anger, or it may see it differently if the perceiver belongs
to a different culture (e.g., Goh and Park 2009; Kitayama and Park 2010; Park and
Kitayama 2012). In effect, individual, social and cultural factors can have a physi-
cal effect on brain processes that shape basic perceptual experience and emotional
responses.
Further exploration of some of the other concepts discussed above could bring
additional support to the enactivist notionof predictive engagement.Notions of circular
causality in the conception of the Markov blanket (Friston 2013) are consistent with
the concept of reciprocal causation in enactivist accounts of dynamical coupling;
generalized synchrony also clearly relates to the notion of dynamical coupling and
may be put to use in discussions of social interaction. The idea that priors may not be
confined to brain states, but may be extended across embodied affective and cultural
factors, is consistentwith the notion that the ‘top’ of ‘top down’modulationmay extend
to socially distributed practices (Roepstorff 2013; Roepstorff and Frith 2004; see
Kirchhoff 2015a, b). In agreementwithBruineberg et al. (2016), andKirchhoff (2015b)
we think the FEP is in good theoretical synchrony with the enactivist conception
of an adaptative autopoiesis (Di Paolo 2005; Thompson 2007; cf. Kirchhoff 2016).
Accordingly, prima facie, there is a good case to be made for a predictive model
consistent with enactivism.
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